« Sri Lanka, retour sur un massacre oublié » par Mark Bradley

« La semaine dernière à Genève, le Conseil des droits de l’homme des Nations unies a adopté une résolution visant à faire la lumière sur des crimes de guerre commis entre 2002 et 2009 au Sri Lanka. Entre autres, l’extermination de 40 000 à 70 000 civils, selon les estimations de l’ONU, très majoritairement des Tamouls, par l’armée gouvernementale durant les derniers mois d’une guerre qui a ensanglanté ce pays de l’océan Indien durant plus de vingt-cinq ans, un massacre que le gouvernement de Colombo a toujours nié. »

via: http://www.ledevoir.com/international/actualites-internationales/404152/sri-lanka-retour-sur-un-massacre-oublie

source: www.ledevoir.com

« Conseil des droits de l’homme de l’ONU: Un vote crucial relatif à l’ouverture d’une enquête au Sri Lanka » par Human Rights Watch

Le 27 mars 2014, le Conseil des droits de l’homme des Nations Unies a adopté la résolution sur le Sri Lanka avec 23 voix pour, 12 voix contre, et 12 abstentions. « Le soutien apporté à une large majorité par le Conseil à la résolution sur le Sri Lanka constitue un énorme pas en avant vers la justice pour tous les Sri Lankais », a commenté Juliette de Rivero, directrice du bureau de Human Rights Watch à Genève. « Il incombe maintenant au Sri Lanka et à d’autres pays de collaborer avec le Haut-Commissariat aux droits de l’homme de l’ONU afin que cette résolution soit suivie des actions requises. »

via: http://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2014/03/27/conseil-des-droits-de-l-homme-de-l-onu-un-vote-crucial-relatif-l-ouverture-d-une-e-0

source: www.hrw.org

Communiqué de presse du Conseil International de l’Eelam Tamoul (ICET) sur la Résolution prise par la Commission des Droits de l’Homme

Nous partageons pour information le communiqué de presse diffusé par le Conseil International de l’Eelam Tamoul (ICET), sur la position de la diaspora tamoule eelamiste, sur la sur la Résolution prise par la Commission des Droits de l’Homme.

ICET Communique de Press -Geneva Press Club- 21 March 2014-1 (1)-1

 

Source: Conseil International de l’Eelam Tamoul (ICET)

Nouveau rapport sur Sri Lanka de la Commission des Nations Unies pour les Droits de l’Homme

Un nouveau rapport sur Sri Lanka daté du 11 février 2013 vient d’être mis en ligne par les services du Haut Commissaire aux Droits de l’Homme des Nations Unies, en prévision de l’examen de la situation des droits de l’homme dans le pays lors de la 22ème session qui se tiendra à Genève du 25 février au 22 mars 2013.Il comprend notamment une analyse critique des réponses et non-réponses apportées par le gouvernement aux recommandations de la LLRC (Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission) dont le texte avait été pris comme base d’évaluation lors de la 21ème session de l’organisation.
Le texte de ce rapport dans sa version anglaise est disponible ci-dessous:

A-HRC-22-38_en

Autocritique de l’ONU

Un rapport interne de l’Organisation des Nations Unies (Rapport Petrie, rédigé à la demande du secrétaire général Ban) dénonce les faiblesses de l’Organisation et son incapacité à protéger les populations civiles tamoules durant la phase finale de la guerre entre l’armée de Sri Lanka et les LTTE en mai 2009. Ses annexes fournissent une abondante documentation qui sera indispensable à qui veut comprendre les événements et le comportement de la communauté internationale à l’époque et jusqu’à ce jour.
Les services officiels d’information des Nations Unies ont publié un communiqué à ce sujet, et donné accès au rapport Petrie qui devient de ce fait du domaine public: http://www.un.org/apps/newsFr/storyF.asp?NewsID=29355&Cr=Sri

On trouvera aussi une version antérieure de ce rapport sur le site suivant: http://cl.ly/05042e2R3031. Le lecteur attentif notera que plusieurs passages de ce premier document ont été ‘caviardés’ avant publication; ces passages sont restitués sur le site suivant: http://blog.srilankacampaign.org/2012/11/the-un-internal-petrie-report-into-sri.html
Sans préjuger du contenu du rapport et de l’exploitation politique qui pourra en être faite, qui ne sont pas à ce stade de la compétence de notre carnet de recherche, une lecture critique de la production de ces documents est du plus haut intérêt pour le chercheur en sciences politiques.L’extrait qui est présenté ci-dessous permet de se faire une idée de l’importance du rapport Petrie:

« United Nations failure
75. Cultural challenges: The UN can face significant challenges in retaining the essential support of a Government to help in delivering assistance while at the same time responding to serious violations of international law that may require the UN to issue criticism of the same Government. In the case of Sri Lanka, a number of UNCT and UNHQ senior staff perceived these challenges as dilemmas or as conflicting responsibilities : (i) choosing not to speak up about Government and LTTE broken commitments and violations of international law was seen as the only way to increase UN humanitarian access; (ii) choosing to focus briefings to the Security Council on the humanitarian situation rather than on the causes of the crisis and the obligations of the parties to the conflict was seen as a way to facilitate constructive engagement by the Secretariat with Member States; and (iii) UN support in the establishment of internment camps was seen as the only option for the UN to assist IDPs emerging from the Wanni, even if the IDPs were deprived of freedom of movement and the UN had limited access to them. Decisions at UNHQ and in the field were affected by an institutional culture of trade-offs. The tendency to see options for action in terms of dilemmas frequently obscured the reality of UN responsibilities. In fact, with its multiplicity of mandates and areas of expertise, the UN possessed the capabilities to simultaneously strive for humanitarian access while also robustly condemning the perpetrators of killings of civilians. It should have been able to push further for respect for international norms in the delivery of assistance to IDPs and avoid accusations of complicity in the detention of IDPs.
76. There was a continued reluctance among UNCT institutions to stand up for the rights of the people they were mandated to assist. In Colombo, some senior staff did not perceive the prevention of killing of civilians as their responsibility – and agency and department heads at UNHQ were not instructing them otherwise. Seen together, the failure of the UN to adequately counter the Government’s under-estimation of population numbers in the Wanni, the failure to adequately confront the Government on its obstructions to humanitarian assistance, the unwillingness of the UN in UNHQ and Colombo to address Government responsibility for attacks that were killing civilians, and the tone and content of UN communications with the Government on these issues, collectively amounted to a failure by the UN to act within the scope of institutional mandates to meet protection responsibilities.
77. The tone, content and objectives of UNHQ’s engagement with Member States regarding Sri Lanka were heavily influenced by what it perceived Member States wanted to hear, rather than by what Member States needed to know if they were to respond. Reflection on Sri Lanka by UNHQ and Member States at the UN was conducted on the basis of a mosaic of considerations among which the grave situation of civilians in Sri Lanka competed with extraneous factors such as perceptions of the role of the Secretariat in its relations with Member States and frequently inconclusive discussions on the concept of the Responsibility to Protect. In particular, the Security Council was deeply ambivalent about even placing on its agenda a situation that was not already the subject of a UN peacekeeping or political mandate; while at the same time no other UN Member State mechanism had the prerogative to provide the political response needed, leaving Sri Lanka in a vacuum of inaction.
78. Framework of action: The overall framework for UN action in Sri Lanka was not well- adapted to the Organization’s responsibilities, given the situation. Over the past 15 years, Member States and the UN system have agreed that peace, development and the protection of basic rights are deeply intertwined and mutually reinforcing and that they must be tackled together. Under UN auspices, Member States have adopted a range of interlinked standards that define UN protection responsibilities in situations such as armed conflict. These include: the international human rights law framework of civil and political and economic, social and cultural rights; the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect; and numerous resolutions by the Security Council on protecting civilians in armed conflict through the protection of international human
rights and humanitarian law. All UN entities, whether in the Secretariat or UNCT, are expected to support follow-up and implementation of these standards74; and UN action in Sri Lanka was being measured partly on this basis. And yet, the tools with which the UN can meet its responsibilities vary widely across different country-situations ranging from, on the one hand, Security Council-mandated missions designed for complex political and armed conflict situations to, on the other hand, the UN’s infrastructure in Sri Lanka consisting of a UNCT and RC designed primarily to support development.75 Although additions were made to the UNCT infrastructure in Sri Lanka to help it respond to the conflict, most notably the addition of the Humanitarian Coordinator role and the significant support of OCHA, the staffing composition and structural posture of the UNCT and UNHQ relative to Sri Lanka nevertheless remained largely unchanged. While the UN’s infrastructure remained static, the worsening situation was drastically changing both the UN’s responsibilities and the expectations of the UN’s role. The UN’s development and humanitarian branches were unsuited to the situation and unable to fully address the UN’s political and human rights and humanitarian law responsibilities; while it was these same responsibilities that became most fundamental to the survival of civilians.
79. Above all, UN action in Sri Lanka was not framed by Member State political support. In the absence of clear Security Council backing, the UN’s actions lacked adequate purpose and direction. Member States failed to provide the Secretariat and UNCT with the support required to fully implement the responsibilities for protection of civilians that Member States had themselves set for such situations.
80. Systemic failure: The primary responsibility for killings and other violations against the estimated 360,000 or more civilians trapped during the final stages of the conflict in the Wanni lies with the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE. Under very difficult conditions, the UN succeeded in transporting some humanitarian assistance in convoys into the Wanni, in providing a degree of emergency shelter and relief to almost 280,000 survivors who were able to leave the conflict zone, and in positively influencing some aspects of Government plans for IDPs; exceptional attention was devoted to the situation by some senior UNHQ officials, including the USG-Humanitarian Affairs; and the Panel was inspired to find how far many individual staff in the field have gone in their efforts to uphold the principles of the Organisation. Nevertheless, the Panel’s report concludes that events in Sri Lanka mark a grave failure of the UN to adequately respond to early warnings and to the evolving situation during the final stages of the conflict and its aftermath, to the detriment of hundreds of thousands of civilians and in contradiction with the principles and responsibilities of the UN. The elements of what was a systemic failure can be distilled into the following: (i) a UN system that lacked an adequate and shared sense of responsibility for human rights violations; (ii) an incoherent internal UN crisis-management structure which failed to conceive and execute a coherent strategy in response to early warnings and subsequent international human rights and humanitarian law violations against civilians, and
which did not exercise sufficient oversight for UN action in the field; (iii) the ineffective dispersal of UNHQ’s structures to coordinate UN action and to address international human rights and humanitarian law violations across several different UNHQ entities in Geneva and New York with overlapping mandates; (iv) a model for UN action in the field that was designed for a development rather than a conflict response; (v) the most senior position in the field graded at a D1 seniority that was below the heavy responsibilities required of the position, and a corps of senior staff that did not sufficiently include the armed conflict, political, human rights and international humanitarian law and related management experience to deal with the challenge Sri Lanka presented, and who were given insufficient support; (vi) inadequate political support from Member States as a whole, notwithstanding bilateral efforts from all regions, and inadequate efforts by the Secretariat to build such support; and (vii) a framework for Member State engagement with international human rights and humanitarian law protection crises that was outdated and often unworkable, in part because it did not enable Member States to reach a sufficiently early and full political consensus on the situation and the UN response. »